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Job Mismatches and Labour Market Outcomes: 
Panel Evidence on Australian University Graduates
* 
 
The interpretation of graduate mismatch manifested either as overeducation or as overskilling 
remains problematical. This paper uses annual panel information on both educational and 
skills mismatches uniquely found in the HILDA survey to analyse the relationship of both 
mismatches with pay, job satisfaction and job mobility. We find that overeducation and 
overskilling are distinct phenomena with different labour market outcomes and that their 
combination results in the most severe negative labour market outcomes. Using panel 
methodology reduces strongly the size of many relevant coefficients, questioning previous 
cross-section results and suggesting the presence of considerable unobserved heterogeneity 
which varies by gender. 
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There is a growing literature on labour market mismatch, most of it focusing on 
educational mismatch and a smaller literature on skill mismatch, information on which 
has only recently become available in a limited range of data-sets. In an early study 
Sicherman (1991) found two stylised facts. First, overeducated workers were paid less 
than if they were matched, but more than their matched co-workers. Second, 
undereducated workers were paid more than if they were matched, but less than their 
matched co-workers. These results have been confirmed in a large number of subsequent 
studies, but virtually all of these have been based on cross-section analysis and, therefore, 
may be biased due to the problem of individual unobserved heterogeneity.  Exceptions 
are papers by Bauer (2002) and Tsai (2010) who found that the overeducation pay 
penalty can be attributed to unobserved heterogeneity or non-random assignment to jobs 
respectively. The former uses the German Socio-Economic Panel for the years 1984-1998 
and finds that compared to pooled OLS, the estimated wage effects of overeducation 
become smaller, or in some cases disappear altogether, when controlling for unobserved 
heterogeneity. Tsai uses the US Panel of Income Dynamics over the period 1979-2005 to 
show that, when one controls for the non-random assignment of workers to jobs, 
overeducation does not result in lower earnings. Further, none of the earlier studies 
analyse both educational and skill mismatch together and are, therefore, subject to 
potential omitted variable problems. In this paper we show that if one is to draw the 
correct inferences on the effect of labour market mismatch on labour market outcomes, it 
is necessary not only to use panel estimation but also to use panel data which incorporate 
both forms of mismatch. 
   
 
  3
In this paper we utilize the panel element of the Household Income and Labour Dynamics 
in Australia (HILDA) survey to establish the effect of labour market mismatch on wages 
and two other import labour market outcomes, namely job satisfaction and labour 
turnover for graduates.  Importantly, the survey contains an appropriate question on 
overskilling and, though there is no question on overeducation, we derive estimates using 
the (so-called) empirical method. The nature of the overskilling question does not enable 
us to determine the degree of underskilling and because the analysis is limited to 
graduates undereducation is not possible, as this group has the highest level of education. 
Hence, the possible categories of worker-job matching are limited to: 
 
(a) Well-matched: the individual is matched in both education and skills (i.e. is neither 
overskilled nor overeducated). 
(b) Only overeducated: the individual is matched in skills but is overeducated. 
(c) Only overskilled: the individual is matched in education, but overskilled. 
(d) Overeducated and overskilled: the individual is mismatched in both education and 
skills. 
 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides background information on 
overeducation and overskilling. Section 3 describes the data and Section 4 provides an 
overview of the estimation methods we use. Section 5 presents estimation results on the 
relationship between mismatches and (i) wages, (ii) job mobility, (iii) overall job 
satisfaction and (iv) job satisfaction facets in three separate subsections. Section 6 
concludes. Appendix I contains descriptive statistics. An extended Appendix II, which is 




The overall research strategy adopted here recognizes that when assessing the impacts of 
job mismatch it is not sufficient to concentrate exclusively on earnings, as is the case with 
a good deal of the existing literature does.  It is not necessarily the case that all forms of 
mismatch are involuntary in nature and, therefore, represent a productivity constraint.  It 
is possible that mismatch may also arise out of choice as workers compensate lower 
wages for other intrinsic aspects of the job that increase satisfaction, for example an 
enhanced work life balance or increased social responsibility. Mismatch may also 
represent a short-term strategy aimed at acquiring basic work-related skills in order to 
enhance future levels of job mobility and earnings. Therefore, in order to come a 
meaningful assessment of the labour market impacts of job mismatch it is necessary to 
examine its relationship with respect to earnings, job satisfaction and labour market 
mobility, applying estimation techniques that are robust to the influences of unobserved 
individual heterogeneity bias. 
 
 2. BACKGROUND 
Skill mismatch has become an issue of particular policy concern. The European Union 
has increasingly focused on it because it is seen as damaging to competitiveness (see, for 
example, European Commission, 2009). Since the concept of overeducation among 
university graduates was first introduced by Richard Freeman in 1976 the literature on 
overeducation has mushroomed, with up to forty percent of the working population 
identified as falling into this category and often suffering sizeable wage penalties 
compared to well matched workers. Much of this research has concentrated on university 
graduates for a number of reasons. University graduates have been the largest and fastest  
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growing single education group in Western labour markets for at least three decades and 
the trend is not abating. The presence of overeducation in the long-run is a continuing 
puzzle, given the fact that rates of return to degrees have also been stable or increasing. 
Further, investment in higher education continues to be the highest per person amongst 
all education categories. This makes the decision to become a graduate or not a crucial 
one for all labour market participants, with efficiency implications arising from the 
presence of overeducation. Despite the considerable research attention that the 
overeducation phenomenon has received, its interpretation continues to be far from 
straightforward. First, there continue to be measurement issues arising from the different 
ways in which overeducation may be estimated as outlined above.  Second, some jobs 
may merely specify a minimum educational requirement rather than a specific level of 
education, as other aspects of human capital may be just as important as qualifications. 
Third, in many cases educational requirements may be rising over time as jobs become 
more complex. Fourth, as noted above, an individual may be overeducated simply 
because he or she is of low ability for that level of qualifications, but this may be difficult 
to determine in the absence of data measuring individual ability. 
 
There are three ways in which educational mismatch has been measured in the literature. 
The first, a subjective measure, is derived from workers’ responses to questions on the 
level of education required either to obtain or perform their current job, which is then 
compared to their actual qualifications. The second, an objective measure, derives the 
required level of education for a particular occupation from job analysis. The third 
alternative, the so-called empirical method is used when a data-set being used does not 
contain any direct question on educational mismatch. This compares the actual level of  
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education of an individual worker with either the mean or the modal level of education in 
that occupation, with mismatch usually being defined by convention as a level of 
education greater than one standard deviation above or below the mean or the mode. The 
mode is appropriate where the distribution of over- and under-education is asymmetric. 
Skill mismatch cannot be derived in this manner as it is generally based on workers’ 
responses to a question on the degree to which they are able to use their current 
complement of skills and abilities in their present job. To the extent that workers are able 
to judge their own abilities, this can therefore control for differences in abilities across 
workers in the sample. 
 
There are a number of hypotheses on why individuals may become mismatched. In the 
case of educational mismatch it has been suggested that certain individuals may have low 
ability for their level of education compared to their peers and thus be unable to obtain a 
job commensurate with their educational level. Such individuals will be overeducated, 
but not necessarily overskilled, and though their pay will be adversely affected, to the 
extent that they accept the limited nature of their ability, their job satisfaction may not be 
affected adversely. Some individuals, on the other hand, may choose to accept a job for 
which they are overqualified because it offers them compensating advantages, such as 
less stress or a shorter journey to work for instance. In this case such individuals may be 
both overeducated and overskilled, but despite the pay penalty their job satisfaction may 
be high and their propensity to quit low. A third possibility is that employers actually 
prefer overeducated workers because they are more productive and learn more quickly, 
thus reducing training costs. In these circumstances there may be little or no pay penalty 
and the mismatch may be temporary if such workers tend to be promoted relatively  
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quickly. Skill mismatch, or more specifically overskilling, may result from workers being 
hired when the labour market is slack and jobs are hard to find. Skill mismatch may also 
imply that workers are being underutilized because employers do not possess well-
developed hiring practices or sophisticated employee-development strategies, with 
possible negative effects on wages and almost certainly negative effects on job 
satisfaction and a higher propensity to quit in so far as such workers are able to do so. 
There may also be negative effects on management-worker relations (Belfield, 2010). 
Some authors have attempted to make progress by disaggregating the overeducation 
variable. Chevalier (2003) considered job satisfaction as a possible way of showing the 
degree of match between workers and jobs. He distinguished between genuine and 
apparent mismatch. Genuine mismatch represents a situation in which a worker indicates 
possession of more education than is required to perform the job and also a low level of 
job satisfaction. Apparent mismatch represents a situation in which a worker has more 
than the required level of education, but is satisfied with the job. This is consistent either 
with a recognition that the job requirements are adequate for the level of skills possessed 
by the worker (ie. the worker has low ability relative to that particular level of education) 
or alternatively that the worker prefers that level of job because it is less demanding or 
fits in better with leisure-work choices. There is, however, no skill mismatch variable in 
his data set. 
 
Adopting a slightly different approach, Green and Zhu (2008) distinguished between 
'real' and 'formal' overeducation according to whether or not this was accompanied by 
skills under-utilisation. It was found that those in the real overeducation category suffered 
from higher wage penalties than those in the formal overeducation group and only the  
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former exhibited significantly lower job satisfaction. An alternative approach is to treat 
overeducation and overskilling separately. Thus, Allen and van der Velden (2001) 
examined the relationship between educational mismatches and skill mismatches and 
found that while the former had a strong negative effect on wages the latter did not. Skill 
mismatches, in contrast, predicted the level of job satisfaction and that of on-the-job 
search much better than did overeducation. Green and McIntosh (2007) found a 
correlation between overeducation and overskilling of only 0.2, suggesting that they were 
measuring different things. In a recent study, Mavromaras, et al. (2010) looked at the 
extent of overskilling in Australia and its impact on wage levels using the HILDA data. 
They also argue that overskilling is a better measure of under-utilisation of labour than 
overeducation since it is less likely to be contaminated by unobserved individual 
heterogeneity than the latter. 
 
Kler (2006) has already used the first wave of HILDA to examine the impact of 
overeducation on higher education graduates using bivariate probit models to account for 
possible unobserved heterogeneity, though she does not consider overskilling. She 
calculates overeducation by using job analysis to determine the educational requirements 
of particular occupations using ASCO codes. Kler finds that overeducated graduates 
suffer from lower levels of satisfaction than their matched peers, with the exception of 
satisfaction with hours worked and job security. However, this may be the result of 
excluding the overskilling variable. We extend the analysis by making use of the panel 
element of HILDA and distinguishing between overskilling and overeducation.
1 Only 
                                                 
1 Kler (2007) has used the Australian Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants (LSIA) to examine the extent of 
overeducation (based on the objective definition) among tertiary educated immigrants. English speaking 
immigrants are found to have similar rates of overeducation compared to the native born, but higher rates  
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panel information and estimation are capable of controlling for unobservables and none 
of the above studies used panel data.  A recent attempt to use the panel element of the 
British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) is that of Lindley and McIntosh (2008). As there 
are no overeducation or overskilling questions in the BHPS, they use the one standard 
deviation over the mode approach to measure overeducation. There is some evidence that 
unobserved ability explains some of the overeducation and that, for some, overeducation 
is a temporary phenomenon, but for a sizeable minority there is evidence of duration 
dependence and this is particularly so for the more highly educated. However, Lindley 
and McIntosh (2008) do not have a skill mismatch variable and thus are unable to control 
for unobserved characteristics.  
 
The paper which comes closest to our own is that of Allen and van der Velden (2001). 
They use a data-set with a longitudinal element to examine a cohort of Dutch graduates 
from 1990-91 in their first job after graduation and five years after graduation and also 
identify wage, job satisfaction and mobility outcomes. Apart from the fact that our data 
are much more recent, we have a richer set of controls which enables our model to 
explain twice as much of the variation in wages. We also disaggregate by gender as well 
as identifying the effects of overeducation and overskilling both separately and jointly. 
  
3. DATA 
The data used is the confidentialised unit record file from the Household Income and 
Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survey. In this study we make use of data from 
                                                                                                                                                 
are found among non-English speaking Asian immigrants. For immigrants in general, the earnings penalty 




the first seven waves of the HILDA survey. Modeled on household panel surveys 
undertaken in other countries, the HILDA survey began in 2001 (wave 1) with a large 
national probability sample of Australian households and their members.
1 The sample 
used here is restricted to an unbalanced panel of all working-age employees (16-64 for 
males and 16-59 for females) holding a university degree or equivalent qualification in 
full-time wage employment and who provide complete information on the variables of 
interest. Summary statistics of the variables used in this study are provided in Appendix I. 
The sample size we retain is approximately 1,200 observations per wave. 
 
 Overskilling is derived from HILDA by using the response scored on a seven point scale 
to the statement “I use many of my skills and abilities in my current job”, with a response 
of 1 corresponding to strongly disagree up to 7 strongly agree. Individuals selecting 1, 2, 
3 or 4 on the scale are classified as overskilled and those selecting 5 or higher as skill-
matched. There is no scope for utilising this HILDA question to examine the 
phenomenon of underskilling and so we do not address this further here.
3 
 
Unlike the case of overskilling, HILDA does not contain any questions on overeducation. 
To overcome this inadequacy of our data, we utilise the ‘empirical method’ which defines 
a person to be overeducated if he or she has a higher qualification than the norm for 
                                                 
2 See Watson and Wooden (2004) for a detailed description of the HILDA data. 
3 This paper differs from previous research where overskilling has been classified as severe or moderate, 
against the well-matched reference category. In this paper, our reference category for matched in the case 
of skills are responses 5, 6, and 7 respectively in the HILDA data The rationale for not including 4 in the 
moderately overskilled category has been based on the weak empirical differences that have been traced by 
our previous research (Mavromaras et al., 2009 and 2010) between those defined as moderately overskilled 
and well matched in their skills. This choice regarding skills matching is consistent with the matching case 
in relation to education as the empirical method ignores those whose overeducation is less than one 
standard deviation over the mode. Those with more than one standard deviation over the mode are called 
“substantially overeducated” and are a category akin to the “severely overskilled” in the overskilling 
literature. However, in this paper we forgo the use of the standard deviation measure as our education 
levels are discrete.  
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employees in the same occupation. We start by categorizing the whole HILDA sample of 
employees by their years of education and 2-digit occupational classification. Using the 
mode of education for each occupation, we define a person to be overeducated if his or 
her educational achievement is above the mode of that occupational group.
4 We also 
considered using an “objective method” similar to the one used by Kler (2005) to define 
overeducation. The Australian and New Zealand Standard Classification of Occupations 
(ANZSCO) provides a detailed list of minimum required qualifications for each 2-digit 
occupation, which could be used as an “objective method” for determining the threshold 
to define overeducation. However, we found that these minimum required qualifications 
are generally consistent with the modes of education we obtain using the “empirical 
method” and, where they differ, the ANZSCO measures appear questionable (e.g. degree 
for farmers). It follows that defining overeducation using either of these two measures 
will lead to very similar results; hence we simply use the ‘empirical method’ in this 
paper. As found in other studies, the correlation between overeducation and overskilling 
in the HILDA data is relatively low at 0.197 for men, 0.243 for women and 0.218 for 
both genders combined. Within our sample, 14.3% of men are overeducated only, 8.4% 
overskilled only and 5.7% both overeducated and overskilled. For women the proportions 
are slightly lower, only 11.9%, 7.0% and 5.4% respectively. All of these are lower than 
the often cited 40% figure by Freeman (1978), who looked across the entire educational 
distribution and not only graduates as we do here. 
 
The HILDA survey contains a question in the person self-completion questionnaire on 
how satisfied or dissatisfied individuals are with different aspects of their job, using a 
                                                 
4 The mean and median could be too dependent on the shape of the distribution, and hence we follow the 
majority of the recent literature and use the mode.  
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scale between 0 (least satisfied) and 10 (most satisfied). This includes questions on 
overall satisfaction along with five facets of job satisfaction (total pay, job security, the 
nature of work itself, hours of work and flexibility). The HILDA data set uniquely 
provides contemporary panel information on both overskilling and the job satisfaction 
aspects that are necessary for our analysis of the impact of job-worker mismatch on core 
labour market outcomes such as wages, job satisfaction and job mobility. 
 
3.1 Wages of Graduates by Match Type 
Table 1 reports the unadjusted average gross weekly wage levels for each combination of 
mismatch by gender. Not surprisingly, earnings were higher for males for each category 
of mismatch. Irrespective of gender, workers who were either overeducated and/or 
overskilled earned substantially less than well-matched employees. Within both the male 
and female sub-samples, average earnings were lowest for graduates who were both 
overskilled and overeducated. The next highest raw differential related to graduates who 
were overeducated only. The wages of overskilled only graduates appeared to reflect the 
lowest wage penalty, being closest to the wages of well-matched graduates. 
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
3.2 Job Satisfaction of Graduates by Match Type 
Table 2 looks at the extent to which rates of overall job satisfaction vary according to the 
type of observed labour market match. The highest rates of job satisfaction were found 
among well-matched workers (a mean of 7.6 for both males and females) and those who 
were overeducated only. The overskilled only had average levels of satisfaction which  
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were a full point lower. For men those who were both overeducated and overskilled had 
the lowest level of average job satisfaction among all groups, but for women this state 
was on average preferable to being overskilled only. 
 
Table 2 suggests that overeducation alone, at least as defined here through the empirical 
method, is clearly not associated with lower levels of job satisfaction. At a level of 6.6 for 
both males and females, the average job satisfaction levels among workers who were 
overskilled only were well below those of well-matched and overeducated only workers. 
In general, the lowest levels of overall job satisfaction were reported by employees who 
were  both overeducated and overskilled, (with a mean of 6.3 for males and 6.9 for 
females). Average job satisfaction and the way it is distributed in Table 2 suggest that the 
real driver of differences is overskilling and not overeducation. 
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
3.3.Job Mobility of Graduates by Match Type 
Table 3 presents the extent of labour market mobility among our sample. HILDA records 
whether respondents left their job since the last interview and the reasons underlying the 
job separation. We follow McGuinness and Wooden (2009) by splitting reported job 
separations into voluntary (quits), involuntary (layoffs) and other categories.
5 
Approximately 15 per cent of males and 16 per cent of females per annum were found to 
                                                 
5 Individuals were classified as having voluntarily separated if they gave any of the following as their main 
reason for leaving their previous employer: (i) not satisfied with job; (ii) to obtain a better job / just wanted 
a change / to start a new business; (iii) retired / did not want to work any longer; (iv) to stay at home to look 
after children, house or someone else; (v) travel / have a holiday; (vi) returned to study / started study / 
needed more time for study; (vii) too much travel time / too far from public transport; (viii) change of 
lifestyle; or (ix) immigration.  
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have left their jobs. Annual rates of voluntary separation averaged approximately 10 per 
cent for men and 12 per cent for women, while layoffs were 1 or 2 per cent and 
separations for other reasons 2 or 3 per cent. These patterns varied considerably when the 
data was broken down by each category of mismatch. The definition of job mobility 
needs to use data from two consecutive interviews and the relevant matching status is the 
one reported in the first interview to reflect the way mismatch may induce mobility. 
 
[Table 3 here] 
 
Table 4 reveals that the incidence of voluntary separations was substantially higher 
among workers who were mismatched for whatever reason than among those who were 
well-matched. In this paper we are principally concerned with estimating the impact of 
origin mismatch on job mobility, i.e. does mismatch increase mobility? A related 
question, which we do not examine here, is the degree to which mobility may either 
preserve or lead to a mismatch, i.e. does mobility eliminate mismatch? 
 
[Table 4 here] 
 
4. ESTIMATION METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Wage Effects of Job Mismatch 
To investigate the effect of job mismatch on wage, we estimate the following earnings 
function: 
 




where  it Y ln  is the log of weekly earnings and  it M contains three job mismatch dummy 
variables as defined earlier, namely overeducated only,  over skilled only and both 
overeducated and overskilled for individual i at time t. X is a matrix of other relevant 
personal and workplace characteristics that are used as control variables in the estimation, 
including age, marital status, number of children, socioeconomic background, 
unemployment history, country of origin, employment and occupational tenure, union 
membership, firm size and industry.
6  ε is the conventional error term. We estimate 
equation (1) using a pooled OLS model on a sample of working age full-time graduate 
employees, separately for male and female. The use of pooled regression is a good 
starting point and benchmark for the analysis. It provides us with an overview of the 
relationships we examine in terms of the cross sectional differences in the sample. 
Although largely informative in a descriptive sense, pooled regression estimates are 
always subject to biases due to unobserved systematic individual differences in the 
sample. Thus, we also use panel estimation which controls for time invariant unobserved 
individual heterogeneity and allows us to come closer to making inferences about causal 
effects. The first panel estimation uses a fixed effects model, which takes the form below: 
 
it i it it it u a X M Y + + + + = β α α0 ln                                                                                      (2) 
 
where  i a  is the individual fixed effect and  it u  is the idiosyncratic error. 
 
                                                 
6 Variables are listed and explained in detail in Appendix I.  
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We also estimate the earnings equation using a random effects model augmented with a 
Mundlak (1978) correction to control for unobserved time-invariant individual 
heterogeneity: 
 
it i i it it it v X M X M Y + + + + + = 2 1 0 ln ξ ξ β α α                                                                      (3) 
 
where  i M and  i X are the time averages of  it M  and  it X  for individual i, respectively. In 
principle, the estimates of  α  and  β   in equation (3) approximate the fixed effects 
(within) estimators. Unlike the fixed effects model, the random effects with Mundlak 
corrections model obtains explicit estimates on the variables with little or no over time 
variation within the observation period of the data. 
 
4.2 Job Satisfaction and Job Mobility Effects of Job Mismatch 
For clarity of interpretation we have converted the ordered job satisfaction variables into 
binary variables. In the HILDA data job satisfaction is measured as a 0 to 10 (lowest to 
highest) scale. We use a binary variable which is zero for values between 0 and 6 and is 
one for values between 7 and 10. Extensive sensitivity analyses regarding the cut-off 
points we use were carried out suggesting that estimation results are not sensitive on the 
exact cut-off point selected. The same conversion has been applied to each job 
satisfaction facet variable. The relationship between job mobility and matching models 
the incidence of having moved job since the previous wave as a function of the level of 
mismatch experienced in that previous wave. Thus, the question we ask in the mobility 
estimations is whether mismatch influences the stability of employment. We initially 
model all job separations jointly before estimating models for voluntary (quits) and 




Since binary variables are used for job satisfaction and job mobility, the pooled OLS and 
fixed effects model become unavailable. Instead, we use both a pooled probit model and 
a random effects probit model with a Mundlak correction to estimate the effect of job 
mismatch on job satisfaction and job mobility, leaving the explanatory variables to be the 
same as those used in the wage effects estimation.  
In all, this paper uses a number of estimation methods. Each type of estimation contains 
different information and the comparisons we present are informative. The use of the 
pooled data serves two purposes. First, it provides a set of estimates that is comparable 
with the majority of the literature estimates, where panel data methods have not been 
utilised. Second, it provides a reasonable estimate of the association between labour 
market outcomes and the mismatch. Pooled estimates will reflect the net association 
between wages, satisfaction and mobility with mismatch, caused by all observed and 
unobserved factors. By contrast, panel estimates will be much closer to the causal effects 
between the dependent and independent variables, as they control for both observed and 
unobserved individual heterogeneity. It is worth noting that, since the information 
contained in the data is the same for both estimations, the major difference in the 
estimates is that the panel estimation controls for unobserved heterogeneity, while the 
pooled estimation does not. However, the panel estimates also have their limitations as 
they cannot handle well the cases where there is little variation over time. We discuss 
these issues below when we contrast and interpret pooled cross section with random and 




5. REGRESSION RESULTS 
5.1 Wage Effects of Job Mismatch 
Possibly the most important and definitely the most well-researched consequence of 
mismatch is the effect it may have on wages. A common result in the literature, as noted 
earlier, is that mismatches are associated with lower pay, which reflects the lower 
productivity of a sub-optimal worker-job match, though it must be noted that 
overeducated workers do receive higher pay than their educationally appropriately 
matched co-workers, suggestive of some productivity advantage to being overeducated 
(see Sicherman, 1991). Table 5 shows that OLS estimation produces highly significant 
coefficients in all types of mismatch. Not surprisingly, the strongest associations are 
found for those who are both overeducated and overskilled. The Random Effects (RE) 
model with Mundlak corrections produces, as expected, almost identical estimates as the 
Fixed Effects model and in all cases much weaker estimates than the OLS pooled model.  
 
[Table 5 here] 
 
The first main result in Table 5 is that controlling for unobserved heterogeneity removes 
most of the wage impact for men who are overeducated only or overskilled only. 
Graduate men who change status from a well-matched job to an overeducated only or an 
overskilled only job do not suffer a wage penalty. It is only well-matched graduate men 
who change status to a job where they are both overeducated and overskilled that suffer 




It is noteworthy that the panel estimates of wage penalties due to mismatch are 
substantially different from the estimates of overall association produced by the OLS 
models, suggesting that unobserved systematic differences play a significant role in 
determining mismatch effects. Women in full-time employment appear to suffer a wage 
penalty when they change status from a well-matched to a mismatched job for all types of 
mismatch. This is a significant result as it ties with the literature on discrimination which 
has found that gender pay differentials are higher upon re-employment.
7 When we 
compare the wage penalties of both men and women we see that women suffer a worse 
pay deterioration than men when changing status from a well-matched job into a 
mismatched job, the differential being net of systematic differences in unobserved 
individual heterogeneity. 
 
However, there is some recent evidence to suggest that Fixed Effects estimators (and by 
extension Random Effects estimates after the incorporation of Mundlak corrections) may 
themselves be biased by under-estimating the true impact of some covariates in a model. 
Buddelmeyer et al. (2010) suggested that fixed effects can absorb a good deal of the 
explanatory power of those time-varying variables that show little variation within the 
time period covered by the sample at hand. This is potentially a concern for studies of 
skill mismatch, given that existing evidence suggests that both overeducation and 
overskilling are relatively time-persistent states (McGuinness 2006). To investigate this 
possibility, we estimate a two-stage model whereby we extract the individual level fixed 
effects from a first-stage Fixed Effects estimation and use them as the dependent variable 
                                                 
7 Mavromaras and Rudolph (1997) estimated gender pay differentials upon re-employment using 
administrative data from the Federal Employment Office in Germany and found that the re-employment 
process is associated with an increase in gender pay differentials.  
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in a second-stage pooled OLS regression with all the time varying means of each of our 
original explanatory variables (that is, the Mundlak controls) on the right hand side. The 
inclusion of the Mundlak means as right-hand-side variables provides an indication of the 
relative contribution of each variable (including the mismatch indicators on which this 
paper focuses) to the overall fixed effect.  
 
Table 6 reports the coefficients and t-statistics of the mismatch controls along with the 
adjusted R
2 of each regression.  The time varying averages as right hand side variables 
explain a high proportion of the overall individual level fixed effects, more so for females 
as reflected in the adjusted R
2 statistics. The results confirm that the variables indicating 
overeducated only, overskilled only and both overskilled and overeducated account for a 
proportion of the fixed effect. The negative signs suggest that the coefficients for the 
Fixed Effects and the Random Effects with Mundlak corrections models reported in 
Table 5 may be under-estimating (with the exception of females whose changed status to 
an overskilled only job yields a positive coefficient, thus over-estimating the true impact 
of the mismatch variables on wages). Table 6 results show some interesting gender 
differences. The mismatch penalty for males is under-estimated for all types of mismatch, 
but notably less for only overskilled males. This may not be surprising, in that 
overskilling is the variable that changes most through individual job moves and thus 
contains most over time variation. Interestingly, the result of under-estimated mismatch 
wage penalty holds largely unchanged for females in the category of overeducated only 





[Table 6 here] 
 
5.2 Overall Job Satisfaction and Mismatch 
We treat job satisfaction as an outcome of mismatch by observing the effect that each 
type of mismatch has on resulting job satisfaction levels after we have controlled for 
other factors that may also affect job satisfaction. The interpretation of our results is that 
where a mismatch does not appear to reduce job satisfaction it is more likely that this 
mismatch reflects voluntary under-utilisation of skills or qualifications (or, at least if not 
voluntary, not harmful according to the worker). By contrast, a mismatch that reduces job 
satisfaction is more likely to reflect involuntary under-utilisation. Table 7 presents the 
difference in overall job satisfaction between the well-matched and those that belong to 
one of the three categories of mismatch, estimated using pooled (cross-section) probit and 
Random Effects (panel) probit with Mundlak corrections.
8 We report results for males 
and females separately. Estimates on overeducation only (Table 7, column 1) suggest 
that, once we have controlled for mismatch that is attributable to being overskilled, 
mismatch attributable to being overeducated only has no discernible effect on the job 
satisfaction of males and females alike. This result is in agreement with Green and Zhu’s 




                                                 
8 Note that we do not perform conditional probit fixed effects estimation as it is not possible to condition 
the fixed effects out of the likelihood function. Therefore, we report only Random Effects probit models. 
9 There is a suggestion in the overeducated only results that, when we shift from cross-section to panel 
results (i.e. after controlling for unobserved individual heterogeneity with the RE model with Mundlak 
corrections) a small dissatisfaction effect arises, as the magnitude of estimates rise, especially for females. 
However, their statistical significance remains well below acceptable levels. One possible explanation 
would have been that a sub-group among females would respond differently to overskilling. We examined 
a number of sample splits, including one between married and single females, but could find no such 
pattern in the overskilling-job satisfaction relationship.  
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[Table 7 here] 
 
Estimates on overskilled only (Table 7, column 2) suggest that overskilling can be a 
prime cause of lower job satisfaction, with some gender differences present. For males, 
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity in the estimation leads to considerable reduction 
in the job satisfaction negative effect, more than halving the marginal effect (from -0.685 
to -0.328). This difference between the two estimates implies that unobserved 
heterogeneity introduces a negative bias on the effect of mismatch on job satisfaction, 
which would suggest that male employees of a generally unhappy disposition towards 
work are more likely to end up in jobs that under-utilise their skills, for reasons that are 
not explained by our data. This pattern is repeated for males who are both overeducated 
and overskilled. For females, controlling for unobserved heterogeneity has a hardly 
discernible effect (from -0.661 to -0.625), which suggests that females with a generally 
unhappy disposition towards work are equally likely to end up in an overskilled only job 
as their happier counterparts. Females end up with the same reduction in job satisfaction 
as males when they move from a well-matched job to a job where they are both 
overeducated and overskilled (panel estimate is -0.621 for males and -0.622 for females), 
but unlike males, controlling for unobserved heterogeneity increases their dis-satisfaction 
(from -0.380 to -0.622), indicating that unobserved heterogeneity bias works in the 
opposite direction for males and females. This implies that, although we find that the 
generally happier females are more likely to end up in the both overeducated and 
overskilled category than their male counterparts, the dis-satisfaction caused by ending up 
in such a job is equally strong for both males and females (-0.621 for males and -0.622 
for females). In conclusion, estimates of the comparison between those who are well- 
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matched with those who happen to be both overskilled and overeducated (Table 7, 
column 3) clearly suggest that even after we have controlled for all available observable 
attributes and all time invariant unobservable attributes, job satisfaction can be still 
shown to be seriously damaged by this type of severe mismatch. Our results clearly do 
not contradict those of Green and Zhu regarding the importance of combined overskilling 
and overeducation. 
 
5.3 Facets of Job Satisfaction and Job Mismatch 
The data contain detailed information about the degree of satisfaction regarding several 
facets of employment, namely, pay, job security, work, hours and flexibility. Estimation 
results by gender for all job satisfaction facets are in Table 8. The first row reported for 
each gender in Table 8 is the estimate of overall job satisfaction (already reported in 
Table 7) and the rows that follow report the facets of job satisfaction. A similar picture 
arises to the one for overall job satisfaction in that being overeducated only does not have 
an impact on satisfaction (with the exception of hours dis-satisfaction by overeducated 
males). Table 8 suggests that for the overskilled only the only facet that is consistently 
statistically significant is that of work satisfaction, which is bound to be a closely related 
to the overall satisfaction variable. It is possible that, empirically, these two variables are 
not as clearly distinguishable from one another as we would like them to be. It is worth 
noting, however, that for both males and females the work satisfaction estimates are 
stronger than the overall job satisfaction ones. The marginal effects of being overskilled 
only in the pay satisfaction estimation have a statistical significance close to the 10 
percent level, positive for males (with a t-ratio of 1.64) and negative for females (with a t-
ratio of -1.57, very near the margin of the 10% significance level). The implication here  
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is that men who change status from well-matched to overskilled only jobs tend to be more 
satisfied with their pay. Note that this conclusion is in agreement with the estimated wage 
penalties where we find no wage penalty for overskilled only males and a small penalty 
for females.  Moving to workers that are both overskilled and overeducated, we note that 
dis-satisfaction with work is clearly present and that there is clear hours dis-satisfaction 
for males and job security dis-satisfaction for females. 
 
[Table 8 here] 
 
5.4 Job Mobility and Job Mismatch 
Job separations have been argued to be a consequence of inadequate matches 
(McGuinness and Wooden, 2009). It is useful to distinguish between voluntary 
separations (quits initiated by the employee) from involuntary separations (layoffs 
initiated by the employer), although we should bear in mind that, in practice, there will be 
occasions where this decision will be endogenous. Thus, voluntary mobility is more 
likely to reflect dissatisfaction expressed by the employee, while involuntary mobility is 
more likely to reflect dissatisfaction expressed by the employer. We estimate the 
probability of an individual changing jobs between two consecutive interviews depending 
on their level of mismatch in the job that they left (denoted as “in origin job” in Table 9), 
in order to examine if employees who are mismatched in their job are more or less likely 
to quit or be laid off than their well-matched counterparts. We maintain the same 
estimation methodology and specification and compare a pooled (cross section) probit 





Table 9 contains estimation results on job mobility by type of mobility and gender. The 
first clear message is that, after we have controlled for individual unobserved 
heterogeneity, neither of the three categories of mismatch has any significant effect on 
involuntary job mobility and it is just overeducation on its own or jointly with 
overskilling that increases voluntary mobility, and then only for males. The general lack 
of a significant direct effect of mismatch on mobility appears to be in contrast to other 
published work which has typically been either based on cross section estimation or short 
panel data.
 It is worth noting that the pooled probit models in Table 9, which contain 
many statistically significant estimates of mismatch (especially male layoffs), lose their 
significance when we use panel estimation. This suggests that some of that significance 
was caused by unobserved heterogeneity bias. Note that we reached a similar conclusion 
in the wage estimations after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. Notwithstanding 
this evidence, we think the issue of job mobility and mismatch remains unclear, 
principally because we fail to control for employer-specific unobserved heterogeneity, 
which we would expect to be pertinent in the case of layoffs. 
 
[Table 9 here] 
 
The comparison between the pooled probit and the Random Effects probit with Mundlak 
corrections has an important interpretation in this context: given that the pooled results do 
not control for unobserved individual heterogeneity, while the random effects estimates 
do, the differences between the two sets of estimates contain information about the 
association between unobserved heterogeneity and the dependent variable. Following a  
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similar line of argument as with the wage penalties and using the case of overeducated 
only males as an example, we see a very different pattern between quits and layoffs. 
Removing the effect of unobserved individual characteristics reduces the marginal effect 
from 0.112 to -0.029 for layoffs and increases it from -0.063 to 0.438 for quits, which 
means that using pooled regression over-estimates the effect of overeducation on layoffs 
and under-estimates its effect on quits for males. Put simply, our mobility regressions 
suggest that overeducated only males possess some unobserved characteristics which 
increase their probability of quitting and decrease their probability of being laid off. 
Similar comparisons can be made for the remaining estimates in Table 9 and they show 
no clear pattern by type of mismatch or by gender. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS  
The earlier literature on graduate mismatch found that there were both pay and job 
satisfaction penalties to being overqualified, but most of this literature was constrained by 
the unavailability of data on overskilling and also by the absence of panel data which 
would have allowed for controls on unobserved individual heterogeneity, such as 
variations in innate ability or employability. Our data relate to only one country, namely 
Australia, but the use of the panel element of HILDA and the presence of a question on 
overskilling enables us to put a new perspective on earlier results from a variety of 
countries. 
 
In this paper we have introduced a more detailed definition of worker-job mismatch than 
contained in the earlier literature with a mismatched worker being analysed according to 
whether he or she is either overeducated, overskilled or a combination of the two. We  
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present two types of estimations: pooled cross-section regression and random effects 
probit with Mundlak corrections. Pooled regressions can be informative about the overall 
association between labour market outcomes and mismatch, while random effects 
estimates give us a measure of the possible causal effect of mismatch on labour market 
outcomes. We have estimated a large number of models to establish the repercussions of 
labour market mismatch in terms of individual wages, job satisfaction and job mobility. 
We also carried out the analysis separately for males and females. In general, the data 
support the view that overeducation and overskilling are distinct phenomena, that they 
work differently by gender, that they have a different effect on different labour market 
outcomes and that the negative effects of being both overeducated and overskilled are 
more severe.  
 
Our results differ from the earlier literature in a number of respects. First, for men we 
find there to be a significant pay penalty only for those who are both overskilled and 
overeducated, while for women there is a significant pay penalty in all cases of mismatch. 
Second, for both genders job satisfaction is not influenced by overeducation, but it is 
clearly reduced by overskilling either on its own or jointly with overeducation. Thus 
overskilling appears to be more welfare reducing than overeducation. For many, 
overeducation is a matter of choice or necessity, whereas overskilling is a matter of 
regret. We obtain little further insight when we estimate the facets of job satisfaction 
instead of a measure of overall job satisfaction. Third, in the case of quits, with the 
exception of overeducation on its own and jointly with overskilling for males, mismatch 
has no significant effect on the job mobility of either gender. Finally, a core result of this 
paper is that it shows the very important role played by properly controlling for  
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unobserved heterogeneity when estimating the labour market outcomes of mismatch: past 
results based on cross section and short panel data sets are shown to contain considerable 
biases. 
 
The results suggest that it is on overskilling and particularly its combination with 
overeducation that policy attention should be focused. Since overeducation has no clearly 
negative effect on the welfare of either men or women, its occurrence should not be a 
matter of major policy concern. However, overskilling whether on its own or jointly with 
overeducation does so and its eradication may have benefits for employers as well as 
employees. It is particularly interesting that the wage penalty of mismatch is higher for 
females and so is their reported dissatisfaction caused by mismatch, especially so by 
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Table 1: Wages of graduates by type of job match 
 
 Males  Females 
Well-matched  1537.4 1102.8 
Overeducated only  1161.0 883.0 
Overskilled only  1322.9 1011.7 
Overskilled and overeducated   910.9 711.3 
 
Notes: the sample is working age full-time employees from HILDA 2001-2007; 
  wages are measured as nominal gross weekly wages and salary from main job in 




Table 2: Overall job satisfaction (percentage) of graduates by 












  M  F M F M F M F 
0   0.1   0.1   0.5   1.1   0.0   0.0   0.4   1.0  
1  0.2   0.3   0.5   0.7   0.3   0.4   1.2   1.5  
2  0.5   0.5   2.5   0.7   1.1   0.7   4.4   0.0  
3  1.2   1.5   4.1   5.2   1.6   0.7   2.4   3.9  
4  1.8   1.4   4.1   4.9   1.8   1.8   8.4   1.0  
5  4.2   5.4   10.4   12.4   2.7   5.0   12.0   12.1  
6  7.7   8.8   15.3   14.6   8.5   11.6   17.2   11.7  
7  23.9   22.1   30.0   27.3   21.8   19.7   27.6   29.1  
8  36.2   33.0   23.2   22.1   34.7   34.6   18.0   24.8  
9  20.1   21.2   7.6   8.2   19.0   18.8   6.8   13.1  
10  4.0   5.5   1.9   2.6   8.5   6.8   1.6   1.9  
Total    100.0  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Mean job 
satisfaction  7.6  7.6 7.7 7.6 6.6 6.6 6.3 6.9 
Cases  3,119  2,906  625 457 367 267 250 206 
 




Table 3: Job mobility of graduates (percentages) 
 
  Males   Females  
Did not change job  85.1  83.8 
Layoff (involuntary)  2.3  1.2 
Quits (voluntary)  10.4  11.8 
Other 2.2  3.2 
Cases 3,831  3,291 
 
Notes: the sample is working age full-time employees from HILDA 2001-2007; 






Table 4: Job mobility of graduates (percentages) by type of job match 











Did not change job  89.6  84.6  83.0  74.5 
Layoff 
(involuntary) 
1.4 3.2  4.5  4.6 
Quits (voluntary)  7.5  10.8  11.1  16.8 










Did not change job  88.3  87.7  76.0  81.7 
Layoff 
(involuntary) 
1.2 0.6  2.6  0.0 
Quits (voluntary)  8.8  10.7  15.1  13.7 
Other 1.7  1.0  6.3  4.6 
 
Notes: the sample is working age full-time employees from HILDA 2001-2007; 
  figures relate to job movement from main job between two consecutive 
 interviews; 
  job mobility is defined as a change in jobs between consecutive interviews; 




Table 5: Graduate wage effects of job mismatch by 
type of job match and gender 
 

































































Mismatch incidence  457  267  206 
Cases 3,837 
 




*** denotes significance at the 10%/5%/1% level; 




Table 6: Impact of job mismatch on individual fixed effects by 
type of job match and gender 
 







Males   










2 0.79  0.79  0.79 
 
Female s 
    










2 0.83  0.83  0.83 
 








Table 7: Overall job satisfaction for graduates by 
type of job match and gender 
 







Males   



















Females   























*** denotes significance at the 10%/5%/1% level; 





Table 8: Job satisfaction facets for graduates by 
type of job match and gender 
 







Males   


























































































*** denotes significance at the 10%/5%/1% level; 
  job satisfaction cut-off point at 7; 
  estimation is by Random Effects Probit with Mundlak correction using the same 
  specification as in Table 7; 




Table 9: Effects of job mismatch on graduate job mobility by 
type of job match and gender 
 
  Relative to well-matched: 








Job change (all causes)      





















































Job change (all causes) 
















Layoffs (involuntary)      
Pooled probit  -0.878  
(-1.18) 
-0.021  
(-0.03)  - 
RE probit (with Mundlak 
corrections)  - -  - 
Quits (voluntary) 



















*** denotes significance at the 10%/5%/1% level; 







Table A1 presents the incidence of the various categories of mismatch across each of the 
seven waves of HILDA. There is little evidence of any consistent pattern in the data in 
terms of rising or falling rates of mismatch. Table A2 presents the distribution of the job 
satisfaction by gender and wave. Table A3 presents sample descriptives. 
 
Table A1: Graduate overeducation and overskilling (percentage) by wave and gender 
 
  Wave 1  Wave 2  Wave 3  Wave 4  Wave 5  Wave 6  Wave 7 
  M  F  M  F  M  F  M  F  M  F  M  F  M  F 
Well matched 
Per cent  73  79  68  77  72 73 72 74 71 76 73  75  71 76
Cases   462  429  415  379  437 384 450 382 457 423 464  442  434 468
Overeducated only 
Per cent  13  10  14  11  13 14 13 13 15 13 14  11  18 12
Cases   83  55  82  56  80 71 83 65 98 71 89  67  110 72
Overskilled only 
Per cent  8  6  11  6  8 8 8 8 9 6 8  7  7 7
Cases   51  35  67  31  48 41 53 41 56 32 49  43  43 44
Overskilled and overeducated 
Per cent  6  4  7  6  7 6 6 5 5 5 5  7  5
5
Cases   35  23  42  29  40 29 39 28 32 28 34  39  28 30
 
Total   100  100  100  100  100 100 100 100 100 100 100  100  100 100
Cases  631  542  606  495  605 525 625 516 643 554 636  591  615 614




Table A2: Job satisfaction (percentage) of graduates by wave and gender 
 
  Wave 1  Wave 2  Wave 3  Wave 4  Wave 5  Wave 6  Wave 7 
JS (job 
satisfaction) 
M  F  M  F  M  F  M  F  M  F  M  F  M  F 
0    0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1  0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1 0 0 
2  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 
3  3 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 
4  2 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 2 1 2 2 
5  5 8 6 7 6 6 6 6 4 5 4 5 4 6 
6  10 9  10  10 9 9 7 9 9  10  10  10 7  11 
7  25 20 27 23 23 25 23 24 24 25 25 23 24 22 
8  30 29 28 30 33 30 38 30 36 34 35 35 37 32 
9  18 21 18 18 18 20 16 20 17 17 19 18 19 20 
10  6 7 4 7 4 4 4 5 5 4 3 6 4 4 
Total   100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Mean JS  7.4 7.4 7.3 7.4 7.3 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.5 7.4 7.5 7.5 7.6 7.4 
Cases   688 572 674 562 658 567 669 559 711 609 701 643 695 692 
Note: sample is working age full-time employees from HILDA 2001-2007.  
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Definition of Variables: 
 
Wage: Log of current weekly gross wages & salary from the main job. 
 
Overall job satisfaction: Dummy variable, takes the value 1 if overall job satisfaction is 
7 or above, zero if 0 to 6. 
 
Facets of job satisfaction: Pay satisfaction, job security satisfaction, work satisfaction, 





Job loss: Dummy variable, takes the value 1 if an individual has job loss between two 
consecutive interviews, zero otherwise. 
 
Lay offs (Involuntary job loss): Dummy variable, takes the value 1 if an individual has 
involuntary job loss between two consecutive interviews, zero otherwise. 
 
Quits (voluntary job loss): Dummy variable, takes the value 1 if an individual has 
voluntary job loss between two consecutive interviews, zero otherwise. 
 
Mismatch variables:  
 
Overeducated Only: Dummy variable, takes the value 1 if an individual is overeducated 
only, zero otherwise. 
 
Overskilled Only: Dummy variable, takes the value 1 if an individual is overskilled only, 
zero otherwise. 
 
Overskilled and overeducated: Dummy variable, takes the value 1 if an individual is 
overskilled and overeducated, zero otherwise. 
 
Well matched is the reference category. 
 
Age: Continuous variable, expressed in years. 
 
Age Square: Continuous variable, expressed in years. 
 
Married: Dummy variable, takes the value 1 if an individual is married (or de facto), 
zero otherwise. 
 
Urban: Dummy variable, takes the value 1 if an individual domiciled within a major city, 
zero otherwise. 
 
Father was a professional: Dummy variable, takes the value 1 if father belonged to a 




Country of birth: 
 
Migrant (English speaking country): Dummy variable, takes the value 1 if migrant from 
an English speaking country, zero otherwise. 
 
Migrant (non-English speaking country): Dummy variable, takes the value 1 if migrant 
from a non English speaking country, zero otherwise. 
 
Australian born is the reference category. 
 
Hours per week usually worked in main job: Continuous variable, expressed in hours. 
 




Less than 5 employees: Dummy variable, takes the value 1 if working in a firm which has 
less than 5 employees, zero otherwise. 
 
5 to 9 employees: Dummy variable, takes the value 1 if working in a firm which has 5 to 
9 employees, zero otherwise. 
 
10 to 19 employees: Dummy variable, takes the value 1 if working in a firm which has 10 
to 19 employees, zero otherwise. 
 
20 to 49 employees: Dummy variable, takes the value 1 if working in a firm which has 20 
to 49 employees, zero otherwise. 
 
More than 49 employees is the reference category. 
 
Children aged between 5 and 14: Dummy variable, takes the value 1 if an individual 
has children between the ages of 5 and 14, zero otherwise. 
 
Children aged under 5: Dummy variable, takes the value 1 if an individual has children 
aged under 5, zero otherwise. 
 
Percent time spent unemployed in last financial year: Continuous variable, value of 
which lies between 0 and 100. 
 
Union member: Dummy variable, takes the value 1 if an individual is a member of a 




Agriculture, forestry and fishing: Dummy variable, takes the value 1 if working in the 




Mining: Dummy variable, takes the value 1 if working in the industry of mining, zero 
otherwise. 
 
Electricity, gas, water and waste services: Dummy variable, takes the value 1 if working 
in the industry of electricity, gas, water and waste services, zero otherwise. 
 
Construction: Dummy variable, takes the value 1 if working in the industry of 
construction, zero otherwise. 
 
Wholesale trade: Dummy variable, takes the value 1 if working in the industry of 
wholesale trade, zero otherwise. 
 
Retail trade: Dummy variable, takes the value 1 if working in the industry of retail trade, 
zero otherwise. 
 
Accommodation and food services: Dummy variable, takes the value 1 if working in the 
industry of accommodation and food services, zero otherwise. 
 
Transport, postal and warehousing: Dummy variable, takes the value 1 if working in the 
industry of transport, postal and warehousing, zero otherwise. 
 
Information media and telecommunications: Dummy variable, takes the value 1 if 
working in the industry of information media and telecommunications, zero otherwise. 
 
Financial and insurance services: Dummy variable, takes the value 1 if working in the 
industry of financial and insurance services, zero otherwise. 
 
Rental, hiring and real estate services: Dummy variable, takes the value 1 if working in 
the industry of rental, hiring and real estate services, zero otherwise. 
 
Professional, scientific and technical services: Dummy variable, takes the value 1 if 
working in the industry of professional, scientific and technical services, zero otherwise. 
 
Administrative and support services: Dummy variable, takes the value 1 if working in the 
industry of administrative and support services, zero otherwise. 
 
Public administration and safety: Dummy variable, takes the value 1 if working in the 
industry of public administration and safety, zero otherwise. 
 
Education and training: Dummy variable, takes the value 1 if working in the industry of 
education and training, zero otherwise. 
 
Health care and social assistance: Dummy variable, takes the value 1 if working in the 
industry of health care and social assistance, zero otherwise. 
 
Arts and recreation services: Dummy variable, takes the value 1 if working in the 
industry of arts and recreation services, zero otherwise. 
 
Other services: Dummy variable, takes the value 1 if working in the industry of other 
services, zero otherwise. 
 




Table A3: Descriptive statistics 
 
Explanatory variable  Males  Females 
Age  39.517 (10.067)  37.514 (10.510) 
Age Square  1662.9 (818.2)  1517.7  (817.9)  
Married  0.785  0.641 
Urban  0.935  0.917 
Father was a professional  0.276  0.265 
Migrant (English speaking country)  0.131  0.105 
Migrant (non-English speaking country)  0.146  0.139 
Hours per week usually worked in main job  45.784 (8.669)  42.876 (8.056) 
Tenure in the current occupation  9.486 (9.172)   8.786 (9.215) 
Tenure with current employer   7.615 (8.416)  6.682 (7.602) 
Firm has less than 5 employees  0.044  0.038 
Firm has 5 to 9 employees  0.061  0.066 
Firm has 10 to 19 employees  0.098  0.089 
Firm has 20 to 49 employees  0.177  0.193 
Have children aged between 5 and 14  0.284  0.188 
Have children aged under 5  0.175  0.052 
Percent time spent unemployed in last financial year   0.816 (5.411)   1.243 (7.428) 
Union member  0.316  0.458 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing  0.015  0.006 
Mining  0.023  0.003 
Electricity, gas, water and waste services  0.015  0.005 
Construction  0.031  0.004 
Wholesale trade  0.028  0.014 
Retail trade  0.037  0.024 
Accommodation and food services  0.006  0.006 
Transport, postal and warehousing  0.024  0.009 
Information media and telecommunications  0.038  0.040 
Financial and insurance services  0.074  0.041 
Rental, hiring and real estate services  0.014  0.004 
Professional, scientific and technical services  0.160  0.102 
Administrative and support services  0.011  0.017 
Public administration and safety  0.134  0.102 
 Education and training  0.195  0.327 
Health care and social assistance  0.064  0.238 
Arts and recreation services  0.017  0.015 
Other services  0.020  0.013 
Note:  Mean (standard deviation). The sample consists of all working age full-time graduate 
employees from HILDA 2001-2007, and includes 4361 males and 3837 females. 